The Distribution of Voting Rights to Shareholders
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · 2023-08 · 58 (5) · 1878-1910
DOI: 10.1017/s0022109022000655 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, online erschienen am 25.07.2022. Verfasst von Vyacheslav Fos und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 11-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 37 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This is the first comprehensive study of the distribution of voting rights to shareholders. Only individuals owning stock on a record date may vote. Firms, however, reveal record dates after the fact 91% of the time. With controversial votes, firms are more likely to do the opposite, and this tendency is associated with a lower passage rate for shareholder-initiated proposals. The New York Stock Exchange sells nonpublic record-date information to select investors. When stocks go ex vote, prices decline and trading volume surges, suggesting that activist investors are buying marginal votes. These trends are most pronounced with controversial votes.
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APA
Fos, V., & Holderness, C. G. (2023). The Distribution of Voting Rights to Shareholders. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 58(5), 1878-1910. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109022000655
Vancouver
Fos V, Holderness CG. The Distribution of Voting Rights to Shareholders. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 2023;58(5):1878-1910. doi:10.1017/s0022109022000655
BibTeX
@article{Fos2023,
author = {Fos, Vyacheslav and Holderness, Clifford G.},
title = {The Distribution of Voting Rights to Shareholders},
journal = {Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis},
year = {2023},
volume = {58},
number = {5},
pages = {1878--1910},
doi = {10.1017/s0022109022000655}
}
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