EUVIMEDOpdag EUVIMED
Crossref

Uncertainty Premia, Sovereign Default Risk, and State-Contingent Debt

Francisco Roch, Francisco Roldán

Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics · 2023

DOI: 10.1086/723950 ↗

At a glance

Journal article in Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics, 2023. Written by Francisco Roch and 1 co-authors. Cited 6 times so far (Crossref); 48 references.

AbstractBibliografiske oplysningerCiteRelated studies

Abstract (original language)

We study the pricing, design, and desirability of sovereign state-contingent debt instruments. Using a sovereign default model with lenders who fear model misspecification, we find that the commonly used threshold bond structure leads to welfare losses for the government. While this bond would be beneficial when facing rational expectations lenders, its threshold structure increases the variance of promised returns, which robust lenders dislike. Sovereign state-contingent debt instruments can still be welfare improving when facing robust lenders when designed optimally. Our findings tie the lack of popularity of sovereign state-contingent debt instruments to the particular design used thus far.

Cite

APA

Roch, F., & Roldán, F. (2023). Uncertainty Premia, Sovereign Default Risk, and State-Contingent Debt. Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics. https://doi.org/10.1086/723950

Vancouver

Roch F, Roldán F. Uncertainty Premia, Sovereign Default Risk, and State-Contingent Debt. Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics. 2023. doi:10.1086/723950

BibTeX
@article{Roch2023,
  author = {Roch, Francisco and Roldán, Francisco},
  title = {Uncertainty Premia, Sovereign Default Risk, and State-Contingent Debt},
  journal = {Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics},
  year = {2023},
  doi = {10.1086/723950}
}
Start for free →