Uncertainty Premia, Sovereign Default Risk, and State-Contingent Debt
Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics · 2023
DOI: 10.1086/723950 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics, 2023. Written by Francisco Roch and 1 co-authors. Cited 6 times so far (Crossref); 48 references.
Abstract (original language)
We study the pricing, design, and desirability of sovereign state-contingent debt instruments. Using a sovereign default model with lenders who fear model misspecification, we find that the commonly used threshold bond structure leads to welfare losses for the government. While this bond would be beneficial when facing rational expectations lenders, its threshold structure increases the variance of promised returns, which robust lenders dislike. Sovereign state-contingent debt instruments can still be welfare improving when facing robust lenders when designed optimally. Our findings tie the lack of popularity of sovereign state-contingent debt instruments to the particular design used thus far.
Cite
APA
Roch, F., & Roldán, F. (2023). Uncertainty Premia, Sovereign Default Risk, and State-Contingent Debt. Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics. https://doi.org/10.1086/723950
Vancouver
Roch F, Roldán F. Uncertainty Premia, Sovereign Default Risk, and State-Contingent Debt. Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics. 2023. doi:10.1086/723950
BibTeX
@article{Roch2023,
author = {Roch, Francisco and Roldán, Francisco},
title = {Uncertainty Premia, Sovereign Default Risk, and State-Contingent Debt},
journal = {Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics},
year = {2023},
doi = {10.1086/723950}
}
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