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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Indirect reciprocity undermines indirect reciprocity destabilizing large-scale cooperation

Eric Schnell iD, Michael Muthukrishna iD

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · 2024

DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2322072121 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2024. Verfasst von Eric Schnell und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Cooperative Behavior. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 13-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 39 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Templeton World Charity Foundation (TWCF).

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Previous models suggest that indirect reciprocity (reputation) can stabilize large-scale human cooperation [K. Panchanathan, R. Boyd, Nature 432 , 499–502 (2004)]. The logic behind these models and experiments [J. Gross et al. , Sci. Adv. 9 , eadd8289 (2023) and O. P. Hauser, A. Hendriks, D. G. Rand, M. A. Nowak, Sci. Rep. 6 , 36079 (2016)] is that a strategy in which individuals conditionally aid others based on their reputation for engaging in costly cooperative behavior serves as a punishment that incentivizes large-scale cooperation without the second-order free-rider problem. However, these models and experiments fail to account for individuals belonging to multiple groups with reputations that can be in conflict. Here, we extend these models such that individuals belong to a smaller, “local” group embedded within a larger, “global” group. This introduces competing strategies for conditionally aiding others based on their cooperative behavior in the local or global group. Our analyses reveal that the reputation for cooperation in the smaller local group can undermine cooperation in the larger global group, even when the theoretical maximum payoffs are higher in the larger global group. This model reveals that indirect reciprocity alone is insufficient for stabilizing large-scale human cooperation because cooperation at one scale can be considered defection at another. These results deepen the puzzle of large-scale human cooperation.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Cooperative BehaviorHumansGame TheoryInterpersonal RelationsModels, Psychological

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

cooperationcultural evolutionevolutionary game theoryindirect reciprocity

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom.

ORCID-Profile: Eric Schnell, Michael Muthukrishna

Förderung

  • Templeton World Charity Foundation (TWCF)

Zitieren

APA

Schnell, E., & Muthukrishna, M. (2024). Indirect reciprocity undermines indirect reciprocity destabilizing large-scale cooperation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2322072121

Vancouver

Schnell E, Muthukrishna M. Indirect reciprocity undermines indirect reciprocity destabilizing large-scale cooperation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2024. doi:10.1073/pnas.2322072121

BibTeX
@article{Schnell2024,
  author = {Schnell, Eric and Muthukrishna, Michael},
  title = {Indirect reciprocity undermines indirect reciprocity destabilizing large-scale cooperation},
  journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
  year = {2024},
  doi = {10.1073/pnas.2322072121}
}
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