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Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Indirect reciprocity under opinion synchronization

Yohsuke Murase iD, Christian Hilbe iD

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · 26.11.2024 · 121 (48)

DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2418364121 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, online erschienen am 21.11.2024. Verfasst von Yohsuke Murase und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: RIKEN Center for Computational Science, Kobe 650-0047, Japan. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Cooperative Behavior. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 23-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 60 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Gefördert von: MEXT | Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS), EC | European Research Council (ERC).

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Indirect reciprocity is a key explanation for the exceptional magnitude of cooperation among humans. This literature suggests that a large proportion of human cooperation is driven by social norms and individuals’ incentives to maintain a good reputation. This intuition has been formalized with two types of models. In public assessment models, all community members are assumed to agree on each others’ reputations; in private assessment models, people may have disagreements. Both types of models aim to understand the interplay of social norms and cooperation. Yet their results can be vastly different. Public assessment models argue that cooperation can evolve easily and that the most effective norms tend to be stern. Private assessment models often find cooperation to be unstable, and successful norms show some leniency. Here, we propose a model that can organize these differing results within a single framework. We show that the stability of cooperation depends on a single quantity: the extent to which individual opinions turn out to be correlated. This correlation is determined by a group’s norms and the structure of social interactions. In particular, we prove that no cooperative norm is evolutionarily stable when individual opinions are statistically independent. These results have important implications for our understanding of cooperation, conformity, and polarization.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Cooperative BehaviorHumansInterpersonal RelationsModels, PsychologicalSocial NormsGame TheoryModels, Theoretical

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

conformitycooperationevolutionary game theoryindirect reciprocitysocial norms

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • RIKEN Center for Computational Science, Kobe 650-0047, Japan.
  • Max Planck Research Group 'Dynamics of Social Behavior', Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön 24306, Germany.

ORCID-Profile: Yohsuke Murase, Christian Hilbe

Förderung

  • MEXT | Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS)
  • EC | European Research Council (ERC)

Zitieren

APA

Murase, Y., & Hilbe, C. (2024). Indirect reciprocity under opinion synchronization. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 121(48). https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2418364121

Vancouver

Murase Y, Hilbe C. Indirect reciprocity under opinion synchronization. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2024;121(48). doi:10.1073/pnas.2418364121

BibTeX
@article{Murase2024,
  author = {Murase, Yohsuke and Hilbe, Christian},
  title = {Indirect reciprocity under opinion synchronization},
  journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
  year = {2024},
  volume = {121},
  number = {48},
  doi = {10.1073/pnas.2418364121}
}
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