EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Emergence of specialized third-party enforcement

Erik Mohlin, Alexandros Rigos iD, Simon Weidenholzer

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · 2023

DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2207029120 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2023. Verfasst von Erik Mohlin und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Economics, Lund University, 220 07 Lund, Sweden. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Cooperative Behavior, Models, Psychological. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 54 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Vetenskapsrådet, Knut och Alice Wallenbergs Stiftelse, Svenska Handelsbankens Forskningsstiftelse.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The question of how cooperation evolves and is maintained among nonkin is central to the biological, social, and behavioral sciences. Previous research has focused on explaining how cooperation in social dilemmas can be maintained by direct and indirect reciprocity among the participants of the social dilemma. However, in complex human societies, both modern and ancient, cooperation is frequently maintained by means of specialized third-party enforcement. We provide an evolutionary-game-theoretic model that explains how specialized third-party enforcement of cooperation (specialized reciprocity) can emerge. A population consists of producers and enforcers. First, producers engage in a joint undertaking represented by a prisoner’s dilemma. They are paired randomly and receive no information about their partner’s history, which precludes direct and indirect reciprocity. Then, enforcers tax producers and may punish their clients. Finally, the enforcers are randomly paired and may try to grab resources from each other. In order to sustain producer cooperation, enforcers must punish defecting producers, but punishing is costly to enforcers. We show that the threat of potential intraenforcer conflict can incentivize enforcers to engage in costly punishment of producers, provided they are sufficiently informed to maintain a reputation system. That is, the “guards” are guarded by the guards themselves. We demonstrate the key mechanisms analytically and corroborate our results with numerical simulations.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Cooperative BehaviorModels, PsychologicalHumansPunishmentBiological EvolutionRecordsGame Theory

Stichwörter der Autor:innen

evolution of cooperationevolution of institutionspolicingspecialized reciprocitythird-party punishment

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Department of Economics, Lund University, 220 07 Lund, Sweden.
  • Institute for Futures Studies, 101 31 Stockholm, Sweden.
  • Department of Economics, University of Essex, Colchester CO4 3SQ, United Kingdom.

ORCID-Profile: Alexandros Rigos

Förderung

  • Vetenskapsrådet
  • Knut och Alice Wallenbergs Stiftelse
  • Svenska Handelsbankens Forskningsstiftelse
  • Vienna Science and Technology Fund

Zitieren

APA

Mohlin, E., Rigos, A., & Weidenholzer, S. (2023). Emergence of specialized third-party enforcement. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2207029120

Vancouver

Mohlin E, Rigos A, Weidenholzer S. Emergence of specialized third-party enforcement. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2023. doi:10.1073/pnas.2207029120

BibTeX
@article{Mohlin2023,
  author = {Mohlin, Erik and Rigos, Alexandros and Weidenholzer, Simon},
  title = {Emergence of specialized third-party enforcement},
  journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
  year = {2023},
  doi = {10.1073/pnas.2207029120}
}
Kostenlos starten →