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The evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game with tolerant punishment based on reputation threshold

Gui Zhang, Yichao Yao, Ziyan Zeng, Minyu Feng iD, Manuel Chica iD

Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science · 01.01.2025 · 35 (1)

DOI: 10.1063/5.0250120 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science, online erschienen am 03.01.2025. Verfasst von Gui Zhang und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: The College of Artificial Intelligence, Southwest University, No. 2 Tiansheng Road, Beibei, Chongqing 400715, China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Punishment, Cooperative Behavior, Game Theory. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 14-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 60 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, Natural Science Foundation of Chongqing Municipality, Consejería de Universidad, Investigación of the Andalusian Government.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Reputation and punishment are significant guidelines for regulating individual behavior in human society, and those with a good reputation are more likely to be imitated by others. In addition, society imposes varying degrees of punishment for behaviors that harm the interests of groups with different reputations. However, conventional pairwise interaction rules and the punishment mechanism overlook this aspect. Building on this observation, this paper enhances a spatial public goods game in two key ways: (1) We set a reputation threshold and use punishment to regulate the defection behavior of players in low-reputation groups while allowing defection behavior in high-reputation game groups. (2) Differently from pairwise interaction rules, we combine reputation and payoff as the fitness of individuals to ensure that players with both high payoff and reputation have a higher chance of being imitated. Through simulations, we find that a higher reputation threshold, combined with a stringent punishment environment, can substantially enhance the level of cooperation within the population. This mechanism provides deeper insight into the widespread phenomenon of cooperation that emerges among individuals.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

PunishmentCooperative BehaviorGame TheoryHumansComputer SimulationBiological Evolution

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • The College of Artificial Intelligence, Southwest University, No. 2 Tiansheng Road, Beibei, Chongqing 400715, China.
  • Department of Computer Science and A.I. Andalusian Research Institute DaSCI "Data Science and Computational Intelligence," University of Granada, 18071 Granada, Spain.
  • School of Information and Physical Sciences, The University of Newcastle, Callaghan, NSW 2308, Australia.

ORCID-Profile: Minyu Feng, Manuel Chica

Förderung

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China
  • Natural Science Foundation of Chongqing Municipality
  • Consejería de Universidad, Investigación of the Andalusian Government

Zitieren

APA

Zhang, G., Yao, Y., Zeng, Z., Feng, M., & Chica, M. (2025). The evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game with tolerant punishment based on reputation threshold. Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science, 35(1). https://doi.org/10.1063/5.0250120

Vancouver

Zhang G, Yao Y, Zeng Z, Feng M, Chica M. The evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game with tolerant punishment based on reputation threshold. Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science. 2025;35(1). doi:10.1063/5.0250120

BibTeX
@article{Zhang2025,
  author = {Zhang, Gui and Yao, Yichao and Zeng, Ziyan and Feng, Minyu and Chica, Manuel},
  title = {The evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game with tolerant punishment based on reputation threshold},
  journal = {Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {35},
  number = {1},
  doi = {10.1063/5.0250120}
}
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