What are Duties? A Reasons-First Relational Account
Canadian Journal of Philosophy · 2026 · 56
DOI: 10.1017/can.2026.10077 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Canadian Journal of Philosophy, online erschienen am 05.08.2026. Verfasst von Rowan Cruft. Die Arbeit nennt 43 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
What is the difference between a reason to do something and a duty to do it? This paper develops a relational account of duties, locating the distinction between duties and nonduty reasons in how others should react to the agent’s will: duty-contrary willing deserves distinctively diminished respect from others, when compared to the respect owed to willing contrary to nonduty reasons. It is also a “reasons-first” account, revealing a duty (and indeed a right) to be composed of a specific nexus of reasons for the agent and for others. The account has important implications for how to understand duty-creation in promising and legislation.
Zitieren
APA
Cruft, R. (2026). What are Duties? A Reasons-First Relational Account. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 56. https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2026.10077
Vancouver
Cruft R. What are Duties? A Reasons-First Relational Account. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 2026;56. doi:10.1017/can.2026.10077
BibTeX
@article{Cruft2026,
author = {Cruft, Rowan},
title = {What are Duties? A Reasons-First Relational Account},
journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2026},
volume = {56},
doi = {10.1017/can.2026.10077}
}
EUVIMED