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Can Reasons Be Irreducibly Relational?

James H.P. Lewis

Canadian Journal of Philosophy · 2026 · 56

DOI: 10.1017/can.2026.10104 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Canadian Journal of Philosophy, online erschienen am 03.09.2026. Verfasst von James H.P. Lewis. Die Arbeit nennt 23 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The irreducibility thesis is the view that there are some reasons for action whose normative force is not explained by the value of the actions for which they are reasons, but which must instead be explained in terms of some relation between agents. This view has been developed influentially by Stephen Darwall, Margaret Gilbert, and R. Jay Wallace. In this article, I argue that the normative force of any reason must be explained by the value of the action for which it is a reason, and so that the irreducibility thesis is false.

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APA

Lewis, J. H. (2026). Can Reasons Be Irreducibly Relational?. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 56. https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2026.10104

Vancouver

Lewis JH. Can Reasons Be Irreducibly Relational?. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 2026;56. doi:10.1017/can.2026.10104

BibTeX
@article{Lewis2026,
  author = {Lewis, James H.P.},
  title = {Can Reasons Be Irreducibly Relational?},
  journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {56},
  doi = {10.1017/can.2026.10104}
}
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