Reasons, attenuators, and virtue: A novel account of pragmatic encroachment
Analytic Philosophy · 2025-06 · 66 (2) · 159-180
DOI: 10.1111/phib.12314 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Analytic Philosophy, online erschienen am 04.09.2023. Verfasst von Eva Schmidt. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 6-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 40 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Volkswagen Foundation.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In this paper, I explicate pragmatic encroachment by appealing to pragmatic considerations attenuating, or weakening, epistemic reasons to believe. I call this the ‘Attenuators View’. I will show that this proposal is better than spelling out pragmatic encroachment in terms of reasons against believing – what I call the ‘Reasons View’. While both views do equally well when it comes to providing a plausible mechanism of how pragmatic encroachment works, the Attenuators View does a better job distinguishing practical and epistemic reasons to believe. First, this view does not appeal to the costs of believing falsely as reasons against believing; second, because of this, it does not run the risk of tearing down the wall between practical and epistemic reasons bearing on belief. I underpin the Attenuators View with a virtue‐theoretic account of how pragmatic encroachment attenuates epistemic reasons and close my discussion by considering some objections against such a view.
Förderung
- Volkswagen Foundation
Zitieren
APA
Schmidt, E. (2025). Reasons, attenuators, and virtue: A novel account of pragmatic encroachment. Analytic Philosophy, 66(2), 159-180. https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12314
Vancouver
Schmidt E. Reasons, attenuators, and virtue: A novel account of pragmatic encroachment. Analytic Philosophy. 2025;66(2):159-180. doi:10.1111/phib.12314
BibTeX
@article{Schmidt2025,
author = {Schmidt, Eva},
title = {Reasons, attenuators, and virtue: A novel account of pragmatic encroachment},
journal = {Analytic Philosophy},
year = {2025},
volume = {66},
number = {2},
pages = {159--180},
doi = {10.1111/phib.12314}
}
EUVIMED