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Asymmetric optimal auction design with loss-averse bidders
Journal of Economic Theory · 2026-06 · 235 · 106186
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106186 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Economic Theory, 2026-06. Verfasst von Akitoshi Muramoto und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 62 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
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APA
Muramoto, A., & Sogo, T. (2026). Asymmetric optimal auction design with loss-averse bidders. Journal of Economic Theory, 235, 106186. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2026.106186
Vancouver
Muramoto A, Sogo T. Asymmetric optimal auction design with loss-averse bidders. Journal of Economic Theory. 2026;235:106186. doi:10.1016/j.jet.2026.106186
BibTeX
@article{Muramoto2026,
author = {Muramoto, Akitoshi and Sogo, Takeharu},
title = {Asymmetric optimal auction design with loss-averse bidders},
journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
year = {2026},
volume = {235},
pages = {106186},
doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2026.106186}
}
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