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Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents

Jean-Michel Benkert

Economic Theory · 2025-03 · 79 (2) · 519-560

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01591-8 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Economic Theory, online erschienen am 08.07.2024. Verfasst von Jean-Michel Benkert. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 70 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We introduce expectations-based loss aversion, which can explain the empirically well-documented endowment and attachment effect, into the classical bilateral-trade setting (Myerson and Satterthwaite in J. Econ. Theory 29:265–281, 1983). We derive optimal mechanisms for different objectives and find that relative to no loss aversion, the platform designer optimally provides agents with partial insurance in the ownership dimension and with full insurance in the money dimension. Notably, the former is achieved either by increasing or decreasing the trade frequency, depending on the distribution of types. Finally, we show that the impossibility of inducing materially efficient trade persists with loss aversion.

Förderung

  • Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung

Zitieren

APA

Benkert, J. (2025). Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents. Economic Theory, 79(2), 519-560. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-024-01591-8

Vancouver

Benkert J. Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents. Economic Theory. 2025;79(2):519-560. doi:10.1007/s00199-024-01591-8

BibTeX
@article{Benkert2025,
  author = {Benkert, Jean-Michel},
  title = {Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents},
  journal = {Economic Theory},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {79},
  number = {2},
  pages = {519--560},
  doi = {10.1007/s00199-024-01591-8}
}
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