Linear-efficient-symmetric values and inequality in TU-games
Theory and Decision · 2026-12 · 101 (4) · 679-706
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-026-10129-4 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theory and Decision, online erschienen am 18.03.2026. Verfasst von Marc Dubois und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 42 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Université de Nimes.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper introduces a dominance criterion that determines whether a TU-game is less unequal than another. A game is derived from another by non-void sequences of inequality-reducing transfers of worth between coalitions of equal size if and only if the resulting game is less unequal in the Lorenz sense. The paper also measures payoff inequality among players (for a TU-game) through the Lorenz criterion. When a distribution (allocation) of payoff is issued from another by non-void sequences of inequality-reducing transfers of payoff between players, the resulting distribution of payoff is less unequal according to the Lorenz criterion (and conversely). It is shown that any linear-efficient-symmetric value, being invariant and separable under worth transfers and satisfying a fair treatment axiom, converts an inequality-reduction in TU-games into a decrease in payoff inequality among players.
Förderung
- Université de Nimes
Zitieren
APA
Dubois, M., & Mussard, S. (2026). Linear-efficient-symmetric values and inequality in TU-games. Theory and Decision, 101(4), 679-706. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-026-10129-4
Vancouver
Dubois M, Mussard S. Linear-efficient-symmetric values and inequality in TU-games. Theory and Decision. 2026;101(4):679-706. doi:10.1007/s11238-026-10129-4
BibTeX
@article{Dubois2026,
author = {Dubois, Marc and Mussard, Stéphane},
title = {Linear-efficient-symmetric values and inequality in TU-games},
journal = {Theory and Decision},
year = {2026},
volume = {101},
number = {4},
pages = {679--706},
doi = {10.1007/s11238-026-10129-4}
}
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