TU-Games: Revisiting Fundamental Concepts
Homo Oeconomicus · 2026-12 · 43 (1)
DOI: 10.1007/s41412-026-00166-3 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Homo Oeconomicus, online erschienen am 02.11.2026. Verfasst von Walter Trockel und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 53 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Universität Bielefeld.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This article addresses conceptual shortcomings in literature on coalitional TU-games. We revisit and partly redefine key notions such as coalition , coalition function , efficiency , and duality , emphasizing their dependence on the class of TU-games under scrutiny. We also introduce a refined notion of a dual game, which aligns better with its typical interpretation and coincides with the classical version on superadditive games. Finally, we characterize the cohesive hull of a game via the duality theorem in linear programming, drawing parallels to the construction of the core via the Bondareva-Shapley theorem.
Förderung
- Universität Bielefeld
Zitieren
APA
Trockel, W., & Duman, P. (2026). TU-Games: Revisiting Fundamental Concepts. Homo Oeconomicus, 43(1). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-026-00166-3
Vancouver
Trockel W, Duman P. TU-Games: Revisiting Fundamental Concepts. Homo Oeconomicus. 2026;43(1). doi:10.1007/s41412-026-00166-3
BibTeX
@article{Trockel2026,
author = {Trockel, Walter and Duman, Papatya},
title = {TU-Games: Revisiting Fundamental Concepts},
journal = {Homo Oeconomicus},
year = {2026},
volume = {43},
number = {1},
doi = {10.1007/s41412-026-00166-3}
}
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