Linear Efficient and Symmetric Values in Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility: An Analysis Through Two Null Players Types
Revue d'économie politique · 09.04.2025 · Vol. 135 (1) · 73-93
DOI: 10.3917/e.redp.351.0073 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Revue d'économie politique, erschienen am 09.04.2025. Verfasst von C. Chameni Nembua und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 20 Literaturangaben.
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APA
Nembua, C. C., & Wendji, C. M. (2025). Linear Efficient and Symmetric Values in Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility: An Analysis Through Two Null Players Types. Revue d'économie politique, Vol. 135(1), 73-93. https://doi.org/10.3917/e.redp.351.0073
Vancouver
Nembua CC, Wendji CM. Linear Efficient and Symmetric Values in Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility: An Analysis Through Two Null Players Types. Revue d'économie politique. 2025;Vol. 135(1):73-93. doi:10.3917/e.redp.351.0073
BibTeX
@article{Nembua2025,
author = {Nembua, C. Chameni and Wendji, C. Miamo},
title = {Linear Efficient and Symmetric Values in Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility: An Analysis Through Two Null Players Types},
journal = {Revue d'économie politique},
year = {2025},
volume = {Vol. 135},
number = {1},
pages = {73--93},
doi = {10.3917/e.redp.351.0073}
}
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