Contests on networks
Economic Theory · 2024-11 · 78 (3) · 815-841
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01562-z ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Economic Theory, online erschienen am 21.03.2024. Verfasst von Alexander Matros und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 6-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 58 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We develop a model of contests on networks. Each player is connected to a set of contests and exerts a single effort to increase the probability of winning each contest to which she is connected. We explore how behavior is shaped by the pattern of interactions and characterize the networks that tend to induce greater effort; in particular, we show that the complete bipartite network is the unique structure that maximizes aggregate player effort. We also obtain a new exclusion result—akin to the Exclusion Principle of Baye et al. (Am Econ Rev 83(1):289-294, 1993)—which holds under the lottery CSF, and contrasts prior work in contests. Finally, new insight into uniqueness of equilibrium for network contest games is provided. Our framework has a broad range of applications, including research and development, advertising, and research funding.
Zitieren
APA
Matros, A., & Rietzke, D. (2024). Contests on networks. Economic Theory, 78(3), 815-841. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-024-01562-z
Vancouver
Matros A, Rietzke D. Contests on networks. Economic Theory. 2024;78(3):815-841. doi:10.1007/s00199-024-01562-z
BibTeX
@article{Matros2024,
author = {Matros, Alexander and Rietzke, David},
title = {Contests on networks},
journal = {Economic Theory},
year = {2024},
volume = {78},
number = {3},
pages = {815--841},
doi = {10.1007/s00199-024-01562-z}
}
EUVIMED