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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Contingent Prizes in Dynamic Contests

Jorge Lemus, Guillermo Marshall

The RAND Journal of Economics · 2025-12 · 56 (4) · 476-493

DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.70019 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The RAND Journal of Economics, online erschienen am 05.11.2025. Verfasst von Jorge Lemus und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 27 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Firms and government agencies increasingly use online contests to find solutions to problems. These contests allow players to make multiple attempts, and their progress is tracked on a real‐time public leaderboard. Although the contests are dynamic , contest sponsors miss the opportunity to dynamically shape players' incentives, as they award the entire prize pool based only on players' final rankings. We propose the use of contingent prizes that depend on the game's history to incentivize players throughout the contest. We present evidence from two methodologies—a structural model and an RCT—showing that contingent prizes can significantly improve contest outcomes.

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APA

Lemus, J., & Marshall, G. (2025). Contingent Prizes in Dynamic Contests. The RAND Journal of Economics, 56(4), 476-493. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.70019

Vancouver

Lemus J, Marshall G. Contingent Prizes in Dynamic Contests. The RAND Journal of Economics. 2025;56(4):476-493. doi:10.1111/1756-2171.70019

BibTeX
@article{Lemus2025,
  author = {Lemus, Jorge and Marshall, Guillermo},
  title = {Contingent Prizes in Dynamic Contests},
  journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {56},
  number = {4},
  pages = {476--493},
  doi = {10.1111/1756-2171.70019}
}
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