Electoral contests over voter beliefs
American Journal of Political Science · 19.07.2026
DOI: 10.1111/ajps.70075 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Journal of Political Science, online erschienen am 19.07.2026. Verfasst von Dan Alexander und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 63 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Voter perceptions of candidates are the substrate on which campaigns act. It is costly, however, for voters to devote enough attention to politics to change their own perceptions of candidates. This paper views campaigns—and the time, effort, and money they expend—as subsidizing rationally inattentive voters' adoption of new beliefs about candidate platforms. We employ an all‐pay contest to model costly competition over voter perceptions. In our baseline model, campaigns seek to improve perceptions of their own candidates. In a variant, candidates engage in negative campaigning. Among other results, we observe platform divergence under more reasonable informational assumptions than previous spatial models, replacing candidate uncertainty about voters with voter uncertainty about candidates. This model serves as a bridge between behavioral research on campaigns and theoretical literature on elections, offering a richer set of empirical predictions while preserving the insights of the canonical Downsian framework as a limiting case.
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APA
Alexander, D., & Evert, A. (2026). Electoral contests over voter beliefs. American Journal of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.70075
Vancouver
Alexander D, Evert A. Electoral contests over voter beliefs. American Journal of Political Science. 2026. doi:10.1111/ajps.70075
BibTeX
@article{Alexander2026,
author = {Alexander, Dan and Evert, Alexander},
title = {Electoral contests over voter beliefs},
journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1111/ajps.70075}
}
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