Performance‐based contracts in cattle feedlots
Journal of the Agricultural and Applied Economics Association · 2022
DOI: 10.1002/jaa2.10 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Journal of the Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, 2022. Written by William E. Maples and 2 co-authors. Cited 2 times so far (Crossref); 27 references. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY 4.0). Funded by: Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Station, National Institute of Food and Agriculture.
Abstract (original language)
Feeder cattle markets suffer from asymmetric information as sellers have information that buyers do not. Since buyers cannot fully determine the quality of feeder cattle, they pay for an “average” quality that is only adjusted by observable characteristics. A contract design is introduced that allows buyers to differentiate producers by offering a menu of contracts. The offered contracts contain a premium that is paid when a lot of cattle reach a target performance indicator, such as average daily gain. Results suggest the contract can successfully allow buyers to purchase high‐quality cattle, avoiding purchasing low‐quality cattle.
Funding
- Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Station
- National Institute of Food and Agriculture
Cite
APA
Maples, W. E., DeVuyst, E. A., & Brorsen, B. W. (2022). Performance‐based contracts in cattle feedlots. Journal of the Agricultural and Applied Economics Association. https://doi.org/10.1002/jaa2.10
Vancouver
Maples WE, DeVuyst EA, Brorsen BW. Performance‐based contracts in cattle feedlots. Journal of the Agricultural and Applied Economics Association. 2022. doi:10.1002/jaa2.10
BibTeX
@article{Maples2022,
author = {Maples, William E. and DeVuyst, Eric A. and Brorsen, B. Wade},
title = {Performance‐based contracts in cattle feedlots},
journal = {Journal of the Agricultural and Applied Economics Association},
year = {2022},
doi = {10.1002/jaa2.10}
}
EUVIMED