Relative Performance Contracts Versus Group Contracts with Hidden Savings
The Developing Economies · 2026-12 · 64 (4) · 287-298
DOI: 10.1111/deve.12454 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Developing Economies, online erschienen am 17.11.2025. Verfasst von Archawa Paweenawat. Die Arbeit nennt 22 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper examines how unobserved savings affect the benefits of relative performance contracts versus group contracts. Using a dynamic moral hazard model in which agents can secretly save, the study suggests that the benefits of group contracts increase with greater inequality between agents and decrease with stronger income correlation. Moreover, hidden savings enhance the relative benefits of group contracts, amplifying the effect of inequality while diminishing the effect of income correlation. Additionally, under group contracts, agents rely more on risk‐sharing networks and less on their own savings. Empirical analysis from rural Thailand—using detailed household data on characteristics, loan choices, and responses to liquidity shocks—supports the model's predictions. Households are more likely to choose group loans in areas with severe hidden savings problems or low income correlation. Furthermore, households with group loans rely more on risk‐sharing networks to manage liquidity shocks.
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APA
Paweenawat, A. (2026). Relative Performance Contracts Versus Group Contracts with Hidden Savings. The Developing Economies, 64(4), 287-298. https://doi.org/10.1111/deve.12454
Vancouver
Paweenawat A. Relative Performance Contracts Versus Group Contracts with Hidden Savings. The Developing Economies. 2026;64(4):287-298. doi:10.1111/deve.12454
BibTeX
@article{Paweenawat2026,
author = {Paweenawat, Archawa},
title = {Relative Performance Contracts Versus Group Contracts with Hidden Savings},
journal = {The Developing Economies},
year = {2026},
volume = {64},
number = {4},
pages = {287--298},
doi = {10.1111/deve.12454}
}
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