Suboptimal Liability in Cooperative Supergames and Resilient Official Cartels in Brazil
Revista de Derecho Aplicado LLM UC · 2018
DOI: 10.7764/rda.0.2.611 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Revista de Derecho Aplicado LLM UC, 2018. Verfasst von Roberto D. Taufick.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Since 2013, when CADE changed its anti-cartel policy to boost cease-and-desist agreements, the number of immunity agreements has remained stable whereas cease-and-desist agreements have skyrocketed. Using three approaches — legal framework, game theory and economic analysis of the law —, this paper assesses how the characteristics of resilient official cartels, that is, collusion organized and sustained inside the state, make CADE’s new anti-cartel policy inappropriate to fight them. We argue that by prioritizing cease-and-desist agreements CADE has increased the payoffs of cartels, lowered detection mechanisms and increased underdeterrence, turning the option to stay inside the official cartel into the dominant strategy.
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APA
Taufick, R. D. (2018). Suboptimal Liability in Cooperative Supergames and Resilient Official Cartels in Brazil. Revista de Derecho Aplicado LLM UC. https://doi.org/10.7764/rda.0.2.611
Vancouver
Taufick RD. Suboptimal Liability in Cooperative Supergames and Resilient Official Cartels in Brazil. Revista de Derecho Aplicado LLM UC. 2018. doi:10.7764/rda.0.2.611
BibTeX
@article{Taufick2018,
author = {Taufick, Roberto D.},
title = {Suboptimal Liability in Cooperative Supergames and Resilient Official Cartels in Brazil},
journal = {Revista de Derecho Aplicado LLM UC},
year = {2018},
doi = {10.7764/rda.0.2.611}
}
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