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Sustainable and Resilient Governance of Common‐Pool Resources: A Critical Analysis of Non‐Cooperative and Cooperative Game Theory Applications

Luigi Senatore, Giovanna Bimonte, Andrea Gatto

Journal of Economic Surveys · 2025-12 · 39 (5) · 2303-2314

DOI: 10.1111/joes.12690 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Economic Surveys, online erschienen am 22.04.2025. Verfasst von Luigi Senatore und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 12-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 103 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Wenzhou-Kean University.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Common‐pool resources theory has been pervasively explored through strategic approaches. To this end, non‐cooperative and cooperative game theory applications have been developed. Two scholars have dominated the theoretical formulations aiming to find effective solutions for governing the commons—Garret Hardin and Elinor Ostrom. Based on the theoretical and empirical evidence from Hardin, Ostrom, and more recent scholars and theories, this paper aims to provide an excursus on the game theory formalizations supporting the commons theory. This study argues that this process implied a revisitation of commons governance from threat to opportunity. This evidence was also moved from the emergence of new commons and their preservation. This revival led to new solutions and explorations for sustainable development, polycentrism, and resilient governance of common‐pool resources. These perspectives can stimulate new research, policies, and strategies benefiting from ecological and development economics research, public management scholarship and practice, regulation, and decision‐making.

Förderung

  • Wenzhou-Kean University

Zitieren

APA

Senatore, L., Bimonte, G., & Gatto, A. (2025). Sustainable and Resilient Governance of Common‐Pool Resources: A Critical Analysis of Non‐Cooperative and Cooperative Game Theory Applications. Journal of Economic Surveys, 39(5), 2303-2314. https://doi.org/10.1111/joes.12690

Vancouver

Senatore L, Bimonte G, Gatto A. Sustainable and Resilient Governance of Common‐Pool Resources: A Critical Analysis of Non‐Cooperative and Cooperative Game Theory Applications. Journal of Economic Surveys. 2025;39(5):2303-2314. doi:10.1111/joes.12690

BibTeX
@article{Senatore2025,
  author = {Senatore, Luigi and Bimonte, Giovanna and Gatto, Andrea},
  title = {Sustainable and Resilient Governance of Common‐Pool Resources: A Critical Analysis of Non‐Cooperative and Cooperative Game Theory Applications},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Surveys},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {39},
  number = {5},
  pages = {2303--2314},
  doi = {10.1111/joes.12690}
}
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