Sustainable and Resilient Governance of Common‐Pool Resources: A Critical Analysis of Non‐Cooperative and Cooperative Game Theory Applications
Journal of Economic Surveys · 2025-12 · 39 (5) · 2303-2314
DOI: 10.1111/joes.12690 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Economic Surveys, online erschienen am 22.04.2025. Verfasst von Luigi Senatore und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 12-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 103 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: Wenzhou-Kean University.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Common‐pool resources theory has been pervasively explored through strategic approaches. To this end, non‐cooperative and cooperative game theory applications have been developed. Two scholars have dominated the theoretical formulations aiming to find effective solutions for governing the commons—Garret Hardin and Elinor Ostrom. Based on the theoretical and empirical evidence from Hardin, Ostrom, and more recent scholars and theories, this paper aims to provide an excursus on the game theory formalizations supporting the commons theory. This study argues that this process implied a revisitation of commons governance from threat to opportunity. This evidence was also moved from the emergence of new commons and their preservation. This revival led to new solutions and explorations for sustainable development, polycentrism, and resilient governance of common‐pool resources. These perspectives can stimulate new research, policies, and strategies benefiting from ecological and development economics research, public management scholarship and practice, regulation, and decision‐making.
Förderung
- Wenzhou-Kean University
Zitieren
APA
Senatore, L., Bimonte, G., & Gatto, A. (2025). Sustainable and Resilient Governance of Common‐Pool Resources: A Critical Analysis of Non‐Cooperative and Cooperative Game Theory Applications. Journal of Economic Surveys, 39(5), 2303-2314. https://doi.org/10.1111/joes.12690
Vancouver
Senatore L, Bimonte G, Gatto A. Sustainable and Resilient Governance of Common‐Pool Resources: A Critical Analysis of Non‐Cooperative and Cooperative Game Theory Applications. Journal of Economic Surveys. 2025;39(5):2303-2314. doi:10.1111/joes.12690
BibTeX
@article{Senatore2025,
author = {Senatore, Luigi and Bimonte, Giovanna and Gatto, Andrea},
title = {Sustainable and Resilient Governance of Common‐Pool Resources: A Critical Analysis of Non‐Cooperative and Cooperative Game Theory Applications},
journal = {Journal of Economic Surveys},
year = {2025},
volume = {39},
number = {5},
pages = {2303--2314},
doi = {10.1111/joes.12690}
}
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