Dynamic Differential Games of Nuclear Proliferation and Preemption under Uncertainty: Endogenous Deterrence, Multi-Stage Escalation, and Optimal Strike Policies
Dialogic STEM Journal · 09.05.2026 · 1 (1) · 1
DOI: 10.66845/dstem.2026.00003 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Dialogic STEM Journal, online erschienen am 09.05.2026. Verfasst von Innocent Adinebo Katule und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 34 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The nuclear proliferation problem is an important issue in the field of nuclear strategy, characterized by dynamic investments by states and possibilities of preventive actions. The conventional static game models cannot capture dynamic processes, uncertainties, and irreversibility inherent in nuclear strategy problems. This work aims to develop a unified differential game model for nuclear strategy problems, addressing the gaps identified by conventional models. Specifically, we propose a comprehensive differential game model for nuclear strategy problems, focusing on the interaction between a proliferating state, e.g., Iran, and a preventive state, e.g., Israel/US, within the context of nuclear weapons development. Our differential game model combines four distinct yet integrated models, each of which progressively incorporates all critical elements of nuclear strategy problems. Model 1: This model establishes a one-state differential game foundation, where the proliferator invests resources in nuclear capability, and the preventer invests resources in prevention, including a costly, capability-reducing preventive strike. Model 2: This model incorporates asymmetric information, where the speed of nuclear breakout by the proliferator is considered a private information, and the preventer learns from an imperfect observation of the state through Bayesian updating. Model 3: This model employs a multi-stage, continuous time Markov chain method, capturing dynamic nuclear R&D, enrichment, and weaponization, as well as the stage-dependent effectiveness of prevention. Model 4: This model develops a two-state differential game model, where the proliferator has the option of investing resources in deterrence capabilities, making a preventive strike by the preventer more costly. For each model, we derive the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations, and then analyse the optimal feedback strategies, as well as the equilibrium conditions, for each model. Our results reveal important strategic phenomena, including signalling incentives, pre-emption traps, and deterrence stability, providing a rigorous mathematical foundation for nuclear strategy problems, with testable implications for policy, e.g., optimal sanctions, intelligence, and military intervention.
Zitieren
APA
Katule, I. A., & Okedoye, A. M. (2026). Dynamic Differential Games of Nuclear Proliferation and Preemption under Uncertainty: Endogenous Deterrence, Multi-Stage Escalation, and Optimal Strike Policies. Dialogic STEM Journal, 1(1), 1. https://doi.org/10.66845/dstem.2026.00003
Vancouver
Katule IA, Okedoye AM. Dynamic Differential Games of Nuclear Proliferation and Preemption under Uncertainty: Endogenous Deterrence, Multi-Stage Escalation, and Optimal Strike Policies. Dialogic STEM Journal. 2026;1(1):1. doi:10.66845/dstem.2026.00003
BibTeX
@article{Katule2026,
author = {Katule, Innocent Adinebo and Okedoye, Akindele Michael},
title = {Dynamic Differential Games of Nuclear Proliferation and Preemption under Uncertainty: Endogenous Deterrence, Multi-Stage Escalation, and Optimal Strike Policies},
journal = {Dialogic STEM Journal},
year = {2026},
volume = {1},
number = {1},
pages = {1},
doi = {10.66845/dstem.2026.00003}
}
EUVIMED