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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Relationship-Based Bidding in IPO Auctions: Empirical Evidence on Market Behavior

Alexander Wellington, Charlotte Hughes, Benjamin Carter

International Journal of Business and Social Science Studies · 2026

DOI: 10.66795/ijbsss34 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Journal of Business and Social Science Studies, 2026. Verfasst von Alexander Wellington und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The mechanisms through which initial public offerings are priced and allocated remain a central topic in financial economics. While traditional bookbuilding relies heavily on the discretion of underwriters and their established relationships with institutional investors, auction mechanisms are theoretically designed to democratize the allocation process by relying strictly on price and quantity bids. However, empirical evidence suggests that relationship-based bidding persists even within auction frameworks, fundamentally altering market behavior and outcomes. This paper provides a comprehensive investigation into the manifestation and impact of relationship-based bidding in initial public offering auctions. Utilizing a vast dataset of auction-based offerings, we construct network metrics to quantify the strength of prior ties between bidding institutions and underwriting syndicates. Our analysis reveals that despite the formal rules of the auction, institutional investors with stronger historical ties to underwriters submit more aggressive bids and receive systematically larger allocations. Furthermore, we explore how these relationship dynamics influence initial pricing efficiency, post-market volatility, and long-term performance. The findings indicate that relationship bidding acts as a double-edged sword; it facilitates information production and reduces the winner's curse for connected participants, but simultaneously introduces a layer of market segmentation that disadvantages retail and unconnected institutional bidders. These results challenge the prevailing assumption that auction mechanisms completely neutralize relationship advantages and offer critical insights for market regulators designing equitable capital formation environments.

Zitieren

APA

Wellington, A., Hughes, C., & Carter, B. (2026). Relationship-Based Bidding in IPO Auctions: Empirical Evidence on Market Behavior. International Journal of Business and Social Science Studies. https://doi.org/10.66795/ijbsss34

Vancouver

Wellington A, Hughes C, Carter B. Relationship-Based Bidding in IPO Auctions: Empirical Evidence on Market Behavior. International Journal of Business and Social Science Studies. 2026. doi:10.66795/ijbsss34

BibTeX
@article{Wellington2026,
  author = {Wellington, Alexander and Hughes, Charlotte and Carter, Benjamin},
  title = {Relationship-Based Bidding in IPO Auctions: Empirical Evidence on Market Behavior},
  journal = {International Journal of Business and Social Science Studies},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.66795/ijbsss34}
}
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