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Strategic Bidding Incentives in Ethereum Block Building Auctions

Fei Wu, Thomas Thiery, Stefanos Leonardos, Carmine Ventre

Distributed Ledger Technologies: Research and Practice · 23.07.2026

DOI: 10.1145/3833393 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Distributed Ledger Technologies: Research and Practice, online erschienen am 23.07.2026. Verfasst von Fei Wu und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 61 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Block production in modern blockchains is increasingly shaped by economic gains that arise from control over transaction ordering. These gains—known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV)—have led to concerns about centralization and market power among blockchain consensus participants. To address these concerns, Ethereum introduced Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS), in which specialized block builders compete in block building auctions to construct blocks on behalf of validators. The current implementation of PBS, MEV-Boost, mediates this competition through an open-bid first-price ascending auction, termed the MEV-Boost auction. This paper analyzes the strategic incentives of builders in MEV-Boost auctions. We develop an agent-based simulation framework and apply empirical game-theoretic analysis to study how asymmetries in network latency and access to MEV opportunities shape bidding behavior and market concentration. Our findings show that while latency differences mildly affect builder incentives, MEV opportunity access fundamentally alters equilibrium strategies: builders with privileged access to MEV opportunities bid less aggressively, maintain higher profit margins, dominate market share, and reduce proposer revenue. These effects contribute to centralization and oligopolistic outcomes in the builder market. To validate these findings, we further analyze an idealized symmetric benchmark market where builders have comparable latency and MEV access. Under such settings, the auction behaves as expected—bidding is competitive, proposer revenue is higher, and the market is more decentralized—confirming that the observed inefficiencies arise specifically from the asymmetries present in practice.

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APA

Wu, F., Thiery, T., Leonardos, S., & Ventre, C. (2026). Strategic Bidding Incentives in Ethereum Block Building Auctions. Distributed Ledger Technologies: Research and Practice. https://doi.org/10.1145/3833393

Vancouver

Wu F, Thiery T, Leonardos S, Ventre C. Strategic Bidding Incentives in Ethereum Block Building Auctions. Distributed Ledger Technologies: Research and Practice. 2026. doi:10.1145/3833393

BibTeX
@article{Wu2026,
  author = {Wu, Fei and Thiery, Thomas and Leonardos, Stefanos and Ventre, Carmine},
  title = {Strategic Bidding Incentives in Ethereum Block Building Auctions},
  journal = {Distributed Ledger Technologies: Research and Practice},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1145/3833393}
}
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