Vietnam and After: Failure in the Vietnam War and the Enduring Defects in US Strategic Culture
Military Strategy Magazine · 2012
DOI: 10.64148/msm.article.569 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Military Strategy Magazine, 2012. Written by C. Dale Walton.
Abstract (original language)
C. Dale Walton examines US decisions regarding war and peace from the Vietnam War to the present. He finds a disturbing pattern of “anti-Clausewitzian” behavior. Walton argues that the US military is very good at fighting wars, but America’s civilian leaders frequently have misused their military instrument, engaging in ill-conceived adventures without first carefully assessing likely human, financial, and other costs, establishing clear goals, and crafting a realistic roadmap for winning the conflict in a timely fashion.
Cite
APA
Walton, C. D. (2012). Vietnam and After: Failure in the Vietnam War and the Enduring Defects in US Strategic Culture. Military Strategy Magazine. https://doi.org/10.64148/msm.article.569
Vancouver
Walton CD. Vietnam and After: Failure in the Vietnam War and the Enduring Defects in US Strategic Culture. Military Strategy Magazine. 2012. doi:10.64148/msm.article.569
BibTeX
@article{Walton2012,
author = {Walton, C. Dale},
title = {Vietnam and After: Failure in the Vietnam War and the Enduring Defects in US Strategic Culture},
journal = {Military Strategy Magazine},
year = {2012},
doi = {10.64148/msm.article.569}
}
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