On Bunge’s axiomatizations of “partial truth”
Disputatio · 2025-12-30 · 14 (29)
DOI: 10.63413/disputatio.765 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Disputatio, published online on 2025-12-30. Written by Alejandro Gracia Di Rienzo. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (original language)
One of the most notable theses Bunge defended regarding the concept of truth in empirical sciences was that it comes in degrees, in contrast to the usual assumption that there are only two truth-values, an assumption which according to him is fully adequate only for the formal disciplines of logic and pure mathematics. This paper discusses Bunge’s successive attempts at formulating an axiomatic theory of partial truth. I will briefly point out the formal defects of his earlier theories and I will prove that the latest formulations of his theory (made by himself and G. E. Romero) are still not adequate – the most recent one being, in fact, inconsistent.
Cite
APA
Rienzo, A. G. D. (2025). On Bunge’s axiomatizations of “partial truth”. Disputatio, 14(29). https://doi.org/10.63413/disputatio.765
Vancouver
Rienzo AGD. On Bunge’s axiomatizations of “partial truth”. Disputatio. 2025;14(29). doi:10.63413/disputatio.765
BibTeX
@article{Rienzo2025,
author = {Rienzo, Alejandro Gracia Di},
title = {On Bunge’s axiomatizations of “partial truth”},
journal = {Disputatio},
year = {2025},
volume = {14},
number = {29},
doi = {10.63413/disputatio.765}
}
EUVIMED