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Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

On Bunge’s axiomatizations of “partial truth”

Alejandro Gracia Di Rienzo

Disputatio · 30.12.2025 · 14 (29)

DOI: 10.63413/disputatio.765 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Disputatio, online erschienen am 30.12.2025. Verfasst von Alejandro Gracia Di Rienzo. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

One of the most notable theses Bunge defended regarding the concept of truth in empirical sciences was that it comes in degrees, in contrast to the usual assumption that there are only two truth-values, an assumption which according to him is fully adequate only for the formal disciplines of logic and pure mathematics. This paper discusses Bunge’s successive attempts at formulating an axiomatic theory of partial truth. I will briefly point out the formal defects of his earlier theories and I will prove that the latest formulations of his theory (made by himself and G. E. Romero) are still not adequate – the most recent one being, in fact, inconsistent.

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APA

Rienzo, A. G. D. (2025). On Bunge’s axiomatizations of “partial truth”. Disputatio, 14(29). https://doi.org/10.63413/disputatio.765

Vancouver

Rienzo AGD. On Bunge’s axiomatizations of “partial truth”. Disputatio. 2025;14(29). doi:10.63413/disputatio.765

BibTeX
@article{Rienzo2025,
  author = {Rienzo, Alejandro Gracia Di},
  title = {On Bunge’s axiomatizations of “partial truth”},
  journal = {Disputatio},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {14},
  number = {29},
  doi = {10.63413/disputatio.765}
}
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