Cheap Promises : Why Corporate Climate Commitments Fail, and Whether Green Bonds Can Help
Economics and Public Policy · 2026
DOI: 10.63313/epp.9056 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Economics and Public Policy, 2026. Written by Ziteng Zhang. 10 references. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY-SA 4.0).
Abstract (original language)
Firms frequently announce public commitments to reduce carbon emissions but often fail to follow through on them. This paper studies why these commitments break down and whether financial instruments can make them more credible. I develop an incomplete-information model in which firms differ in their ability to reduce emissions and complete third-party verification. Because firms can withdraw from a commitment by accepting a reputational or financial penalty, even firms with low abatement ability may choose to commit initially when the cost of failure is limited. The model shows that the equilibrium removal rate equals c/(R+P), where c represents the strictness of the verification standard, while R and P represent the reputational and financial penalties associated with withdrawal. This implies that stricter verification requirements raise the removal rate, while stronger penalties for failure lower it. I test this prediction using data from the Science Based Targets initiative (SBTi), which covers 15,304 firms, focusing on the 6,613 firms whose commitment status has been resolved. Using a linear probability model, I find that publicly listed firms are 13.7 percentage points less likely than unlisted firms to have their commitments removed. This difference is substantial relative to the overall removal rate of 21.1 percent. Although this estimate should not be interpreted as causal, it is consistent with the model’s prediction that stronger consequences for failure increase the credibility of corporate climate commitments.
Cite
APA
Zhang, Z. (2026). Cheap Promises : Why Corporate Climate Commitments Fail, and Whether Green Bonds Can Help. Economics and Public Policy. https://doi.org/10.63313/epp.9056
Vancouver
Zhang Z. Cheap Promises : Why Corporate Climate Commitments Fail, and Whether Green Bonds Can Help. Economics and Public Policy. 2026. doi:10.63313/epp.9056
BibTeX
@article{Zhang2026,
author = {Zhang, Ziteng},
title = {Cheap Promises : Why Corporate Climate Commitments Fail, and Whether Green Bonds Can Help},
journal = {Economics and Public Policy},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.63313/epp.9056}
}
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