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Color as a Mode of Perception: A Philosophical Defense of Adverbialism

Jinyi Zhao

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy · 2025

DOI: 10.63313/crispp.9002 ↗

At a glance

Journal article in Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2025. Written by Jinyi Zhao. 7 references. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY 4.0).

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Abstract (original language)

What is color? Is it an aspect of the world or our minds? Although it may seem superficial and immediate given our everyday experience of color, philosophical scrutiny has uncovered deep ambiguities. Physicalism takes color to be physical, whereas anti-realism assimilates colors to a mass-spread projection of sub-jec-tivity. However, neither account adequately accounts for the empirical com-plexity of color perception. In this paper I return to the ontology of color and provide an account of adverbialism, the idea that color is not something that is sensed but a way of sensing.

Cite

APA

Zhao, J. (2025). Color as a Mode of Perception: A Philosophical Defense of Adverbialism. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.63313/crispp.9002

Vancouver

Zhao J. Color as a Mode of Perception: A Philosophical Defense of Adverbialism. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy. 2025. doi:10.63313/crispp.9002

BibTeX
@article{Zhao2025,
  author = {Zhao, Jinyi},
  title = {Color as a Mode of Perception: A Philosophical Defense of Adverbialism},
  journal = {Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy},
  year = {2025},
  doi = {10.63313/crispp.9002}
}
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