Color as a Mode of Perception: A Philosophical Defense of Adverbialism
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy · 2025
DOI: 10.63313/crispp.9002 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2025. Verfasst von Jinyi Zhao. Die Arbeit nennt 7 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
What is color? Is it an aspect of the world or our minds? Although it may seem superficial and immediate given our everyday experience of color, philosophical scrutiny has uncovered deep ambiguities. Physicalism takes color to be physical, whereas anti-realism assimilates colors to a mass-spread projection of sub-jec-tivity. However, neither account adequately accounts for the empirical com-plexity of color perception. In this paper I return to the ontology of color and provide an account of adverbialism, the idea that color is not something that is sensed but a way of sensing.
Zitieren
APA
Zhao, J. (2025). Color as a Mode of Perception: A Philosophical Defense of Adverbialism. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.63313/crispp.9002
Vancouver
Zhao J. Color as a Mode of Perception: A Philosophical Defense of Adverbialism. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy. 2025. doi:10.63313/crispp.9002
BibTeX
@article{Zhao2025,
author = {Zhao, Jinyi},
title = {Color as a Mode of Perception: A Philosophical Defense of Adverbialism},
journal = {Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy},
year = {2025},
doi = {10.63313/crispp.9002}
}
EUVIMED