Committing Security Analysis of SMAC
IACR Communications in Cryptology · 06.10.2025 · 2 (3)
DOI: 10.62056/avomjb0kr ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift IACR Communications in Cryptology, online erschienen am 06.10.2025. Verfasst von Fan Yang und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 38 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
SMAC is a newly proposed MAC family built based on the finite state machine (FSM) of the SNOW-V series, targeting the high speed requirements in 5G and beyond. In this paper, we study the committing security of the SMAC family. We first theoretically reduce the committing security of SMAC to the properties of the underlying components, including the Davies-Meyer construction and the compress function. We then propose practical key-committing attacks against SMAC-1, SMAC-3/4, and SMAC- 1 × n , as well as a theoretical attack against SMAC-1/2 with complexity far below the birthday bound. To enhance the committing security of SMAC, we further suggest two variants of SMAC that can resist our attacks. Our results shed some light on how to design highly efficient MACs with robust committing security.
Förderung
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
Zitieren
APA
Yang, F., Tian, T., Guo, C., & Yang, J. (2025). Committing Security Analysis of SMAC. IACR Communications in Cryptology, 2(3). https://doi.org/10.62056/avomjb0kr
Vancouver
Yang F, Tian T, Guo C, Yang J. Committing Security Analysis of SMAC. IACR Communications in Cryptology. 2025;2(3). doi:10.62056/avomjb0kr
BibTeX
@article{Yang2025,
author = {Yang, Fan and Tian, Tian and Guo, Chun and Yang, Jing},
title = {Committing Security Analysis of SMAC},
journal = {IACR Communications in Cryptology},
year = {2025},
volume = {2},
number = {3},
doi = {10.62056/avomjb0kr}
}
EUVIMED