Key-Committing Security Analysis of ACORN and Deoxys
Symmetry · 28.10.2026 · 18 (11) · 1802
DOI: 10.3390/sym18111802 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Symmetry, online erschienen am 28.10.2026. Verfasst von Caibing Wang und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 24 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) provides confidentiality and integrity but need not commit a ciphertext to its key. We study this additional property for ACORN-128 v3 and Deoxys-I/II. Our baseline constructions use two distinct known keys and a common nonce while allowing different associated data (AD), and produce identical complete ciphertext–tag pairs. They directly witness failures of the commitment (CMT) notions for the key (CMT-1), decryption context (CMT-3), and complete encryption input (CMT-4), as well as the full-robustness notion for AEAD (AEAD-FROB) used here. For ACORN, we prove full rank of a 293-dimensional binary control matrix, guaranteeing state collisions for arbitrary initialized states; a byte-oriented implementation uses 37-byte controllable AD suffixes and can preserve a common AD prefix. For Deoxys, we instantiate the established AD-preimage technique, requiring two forward and one inverse tweakable-block-cipher calls for the empty-message Deoxys-I construction, and one forward and two inverse calls for Deoxys-II. We also derive nonempty-message constructions and verify two-key instances with both nonce and AD common by solving a binary selection system. Fixed-version reference implementations verify all reported collisions and both decryptions. These results concern commitment under the stated input control and do not establish attacks on conventional unknown-key AEAD security or on specific deployed protocols.
Förderung
- Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities
Zitieren
APA
Wang, C., Xie, H., Chen, Y., & Chen, H. (2026). Key-Committing Security Analysis of ACORN and Deoxys. Symmetry, 18(11), 1802. https://doi.org/10.3390/sym18111802
Vancouver
Wang C, Xie H, Chen Y, Chen H. Key-Committing Security Analysis of ACORN and Deoxys. Symmetry. 2026;18(11):1802. doi:10.3390/sym18111802
BibTeX
@article{Wang2026,
author = {Wang, Caibing and Xie, Huiqin and Chen, Ying and Chen, Huiyan},
title = {Key-Committing Security Analysis of ACORN and Deoxys},
journal = {Symmetry},
year = {2026},
volume = {18},
number = {11},
pages = {1802},
doi = {10.3390/sym18111802}
}
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