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Between Realism and Idealism: A.N. Whitehead and R.G. Collingwood

Guido Vanheeswijck

Revue roumaine de philosophie · 01.12.2025 · 69 (2) · 335-355

DOI: 10.59277/rrp.2025.69.2.10 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Revue roumaine de philosophie, online erschienen am 01.12.2025. Verfasst von Guido Vanheeswijck.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

When A.N. Whitehead left for the U.S., where he would write his major metaphysical works, Robin G. Collingwood (1889-1943) lost a major ally. The philosophical climate in England between the two wars was characterized by an anti-metaphysical attitude which manifested itself first in Cambridge, from the thirties onwards became dominant in Oxford, and eventually found a programmatic expression in A. J. Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic. In this analytic and in part even neo-positivistic climate, Robin George Collingwood, appointed professor in metaphysics at Magdalen College in 1935, in fact was a “lone wolf.” Hence, it cannot be surprising at all that in this period he felt more related to Whitehead’s metaphysical thinking than to the ideas of his “Oxbridge” colleagues. In this article my aim is to show in four stages the relation between the two authors from a very specific view, i.e. their interpretation of the relation between realism and idealism and the impact of these interpretations on their respective concepts of metaphysics. First, I present Collingwood’s interpretation of what Whitehead meant by “a transformation of some main doctrines of Absolute Idealism onto a realistic basis” (PR, xiii). Subsequently, the concepts of ‘eternal objects’ (Whitehead) and ‘abstract entities’ (Collingwood) are presented as the respective building-stones of their philosophies’ idealist flavor. Against that background, the specific task of the metaphysician is elucidated and a comparison is made between Collingwood’s definition of metaphysics as the historical study of absolute presuppositions and Whitehead’s definition of philosophy as framing “a scheme of ideas, the best that one can, and unflinchingly to explore the interpretation of experience in terms of that scheme” (PR, xiv). Finally, it is shown that, whereas Collingwood’s aim was to rescue the philosophical status of metaphysics by studying the historical development of absolute presuppositions, Whitehead applied an identical view of metaphysics so as to correct the philosophers’ failure to detect the correct absolute presuppositions in his own era.

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APA

Vanheeswijck, G. (2025). Between Realism and Idealism: A.N. Whitehead and R.G. Collingwood. Revue roumaine de philosophie, 69(2), 335-355. https://doi.org/10.59277/rrp.2025.69.2.10

Vancouver

Vanheeswijck G. Between Realism and Idealism: A.N. Whitehead and R.G. Collingwood. Revue roumaine de philosophie. 2025;69(2):335-355. doi:10.59277/rrp.2025.69.2.10

BibTeX
@article{Vanheeswijck2025,
  author = {Vanheeswijck, Guido},
  title = {Between Realism and Idealism: A.N. Whitehead and R.G. Collingwood},
  journal = {Revue roumaine de philosophie},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {69},
  number = {2},
  pages = {335--355},
  doi = {10.59277/rrp.2025.69.2.10}
}
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