Territorial Rights and Unilateral Secession
Social Theory and Practice · 2026 · 52 (1) · 61-87
DOI: 10.5840/soctheorpract2026225259 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Social Theory and Practice, 2026. Verfasst von Ruairi Maguire.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Statist (or functionalist) theories of territorial rights have often been thought to rule out the permissibility of unilateral secession from a legitimate, non-usurping state—if states have rights over their territory, the thought goes, then it is impermissible to unilaterally take any portion of this territory. In this article, I argue that the most plausible versions of statist theories of territorial rights do not have the theoretical resources to rule out unilateral secession. I show that proponents of these revised statist views cannot explain why unilateral secession from a legitimate, non-usurping state, is always impermissible, because they cannot explain why other types of entity—such as sub-state nations, for example, cannot have rights to territory. This opens the door for so-called “primary right” theories of secession—theories that do not make suffering from serious injustice a necessary condition for having a right to unilaterally secede. I conclude with a discussion of how to settle questions about the assignation of territorial rights in the event of secession.
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APA
Maguire, R. (2026). Territorial Rights and Unilateral Secession. Social Theory and Practice, 52(1), 61-87. https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract2026225259
Vancouver
Maguire R. Territorial Rights and Unilateral Secession. Social Theory and Practice. 2026;52(1):61-87. doi:10.5840/soctheorpract2026225259
BibTeX
@article{Maguire2026,
author = {Maguire, Ruairi},
title = {Territorial Rights and Unilateral Secession},
journal = {Social Theory and Practice},
year = {2026},
volume = {52},
number = {1},
pages = {61--87},
doi = {10.5840/soctheorpract2026225259}
}
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