EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Unilateral Market Power in Financial Transmission Rights Auctions

Matthew O’Keefe

The Energy Journal · 2025-05 · 46 (3) · 103-122

DOI: 10.1177/01956574241303737 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Energy Journal, online erschienen am 22.01.2025. Verfasst von Matthew O’Keefe. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 37 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This paper explores market participants’ incentives to exercise unilateral market power in financial transmission rights (FTR) auctions. I present a model of strategic bidding in FTR auctions that illustrates how the standard market clearing mechanism for FTR auctions facilitates cross-path competition, limiting the profitability of demand reduction. Simulation evidence suggests that this force can dramatically reduce rents from unilateral market power relative to other sources of auction revenue shortfalls, highlighting potential adverse effects from proposed market reforms such as decentralized FTR sales and bidding-path restrictions that may weaken cross-path competition. JEL Classification: D44, D47, Q49

Zitieren

APA

O’Keefe, M. (2025). Unilateral Market Power in Financial Transmission Rights Auctions. The Energy Journal, 46(3), 103-122. https://doi.org/10.1177/01956574241303737

Vancouver

O’Keefe M. Unilateral Market Power in Financial Transmission Rights Auctions. The Energy Journal. 2025;46(3):103-122. doi:10.1177/01956574241303737

BibTeX
@article{OKeefe2025,
  author = {O’Keefe, Matthew},
  title = {Unilateral Market Power in Financial Transmission Rights Auctions},
  journal = {The Energy Journal},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {46},
  number = {3},
  pages = {103--122},
  doi = {10.1177/01956574241303737}
}
Kostenlos starten →