Unilateral Market Power in Financial Transmission Rights Auctions
The Energy Journal · 2025-05 · 46 (3) · 103-122
DOI: 10.1177/01956574241303737 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Energy Journal, online erschienen am 22.01.2025. Verfasst von Matthew O’Keefe. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 37 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper explores market participants’ incentives to exercise unilateral market power in financial transmission rights (FTR) auctions. I present a model of strategic bidding in FTR auctions that illustrates how the standard market clearing mechanism for FTR auctions facilitates cross-path competition, limiting the profitability of demand reduction. Simulation evidence suggests that this force can dramatically reduce rents from unilateral market power relative to other sources of auction revenue shortfalls, highlighting potential adverse effects from proposed market reforms such as decentralized FTR sales and bidding-path restrictions that may weaken cross-path competition. JEL Classification: D44, D47, Q49
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APA
O’Keefe, M. (2025). Unilateral Market Power in Financial Transmission Rights Auctions. The Energy Journal, 46(3), 103-122. https://doi.org/10.1177/01956574241303737
Vancouver
O’Keefe M. Unilateral Market Power in Financial Transmission Rights Auctions. The Energy Journal. 2025;46(3):103-122. doi:10.1177/01956574241303737
BibTeX
@article{OKeefe2025,
author = {O’Keefe, Matthew},
title = {Unilateral Market Power in Financial Transmission Rights Auctions},
journal = {The Energy Journal},
year = {2025},
volume = {46},
number = {3},
pages = {103--122},
doi = {10.1177/01956574241303737}
}
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