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Thomas Reid on Hume’s Twin Charges Against Theistic Accounts of Sense Perception

Logan Paul Gage

Philosophia Christi · 2025 · 27 (2) · 309-326

DOI: 10.5840/pc202527223 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophia Christi, 2025. Verfasst von Logan Paul Gage.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

David Hume argued that theistic accounts of sense perception face two great hurdles. First, it seems unlikely that God had anything to do with our senses, since, if he had, they would be infallible. Second, the appeal to God is entirely circular: we know that God exists and benevolently ensures the reliability of sense perceptions because, using our reliable sense perceptions, we have proven a benevolent God’s existence. I argue that Thomas Reid’s theory of sense perception possesses the conceptual resources to effectively reply to both charges. These Reidian responses elucidate the role God might play in common sense epistemology.

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APA

Gage, L. P. (2025). Thomas Reid on Hume’s Twin Charges Against Theistic Accounts of Sense Perception. Philosophia Christi, 27(2), 309-326. https://doi.org/10.5840/pc202527223

Vancouver

Gage LP. Thomas Reid on Hume’s Twin Charges Against Theistic Accounts of Sense Perception. Philosophia Christi. 2025;27(2):309-326. doi:10.5840/pc202527223

BibTeX
@article{Gage2025,
  author = {Gage, Logan Paul},
  title = {Thomas Reid on Hume’s Twin Charges Against Theistic Accounts of Sense Perception},
  journal = {Philosophia Christi},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {27},
  number = {2},
  pages = {309--326},
  doi = {10.5840/pc202527223}
}
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