Thomas Reid on Hume’s Twin Charges Against Theistic Accounts of Sense Perception
Philosophia Christi · 2025 · 27 (2) · 309-326
DOI: 10.5840/pc202527223 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophia Christi, 2025. Verfasst von Logan Paul Gage.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
David Hume argued that theistic accounts of sense perception face two great hurdles. First, it seems unlikely that God had anything to do with our senses, since, if he had, they would be infallible. Second, the appeal to God is entirely circular: we know that God exists and benevolently ensures the reliability of sense perceptions because, using our reliable sense perceptions, we have proven a benevolent God’s existence. I argue that Thomas Reid’s theory of sense perception possesses the conceptual resources to effectively reply to both charges. These Reidian responses elucidate the role God might play in common sense epistemology.
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APA
Gage, L. P. (2025). Thomas Reid on Hume’s Twin Charges Against Theistic Accounts of Sense Perception. Philosophia Christi, 27(2), 309-326. https://doi.org/10.5840/pc202527223
Vancouver
Gage LP. Thomas Reid on Hume’s Twin Charges Against Theistic Accounts of Sense Perception. Philosophia Christi. 2025;27(2):309-326. doi:10.5840/pc202527223
BibTeX
@article{Gage2025,
author = {Gage, Logan Paul},
title = {Thomas Reid on Hume’s Twin Charges Against Theistic Accounts of Sense Perception},
journal = {Philosophia Christi},
year = {2025},
volume = {27},
number = {2},
pages = {309--326},
doi = {10.5840/pc202527223}
}
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