Against individualistic accounts of group belief
The Philosophical Quarterly · 20.07.2026
DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqag046 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Philosophical Quarterly, online erschienen am 20.07.2026. Verfasst von Alexander Dinges. Die Arbeit nennt 71 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We often ascribe beliefs to groups, institutions, companies, and similar social entities, and many philosophers inquire into the nature of such beliefs. While different accounts have been proposed, many agree that group belief should be analysed in terms of the behaviour and the attitudes of the group’s members. In this paper, I raise a principled worry against such individualistic accounts of group belief. The basic concern is that individualistic accounts of group belief cannot be squared with existing accounts of the nature of belief from the philosophy of mind, such as dispositionalism and functionalism. My focus will be on group belief, but parallel concerns can be raised for individualistic accounts of group justified belief, group knowledge, and group assertion.
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APA
Dinges, A. (2026). Against individualistic accounts of group belief. The Philosophical Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqag046
Vancouver
Dinges A. Against individualistic accounts of group belief. The Philosophical Quarterly. 2026. doi:10.1093/pq/pqag046
BibTeX
@article{Dinges2026,
author = {Dinges, Alexander},
title = {Against individualistic accounts of group belief},
journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1093/pq/pqag046}
}
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