The Truth Problem for Permissivism
The Journal of Philosophy · 2019 · 116 (5) · 237-262
DOI: 10.5840/jphil2019116516 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Philosophy, 2019. Verfasst von Sophie Horowitz. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 31-mal zitiert (Crossref).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Epistemologists often assume that rationality bears an important connection to the truth. In this paper I examine the implications of this commitment for permissivism: if rationality is a guide to the truth, can it also allow some leeway in how we should respond to our evidence? I first discuss a particular strategy for connecting permissive rationality and the truth, developed in a recent paper by Miriam Schoenfield. I argue that this limited truth-connection is unsatisfying, and the version of permissivism that supports it faces serious challenges; so, for mainstream permissivism, the truth problem is still unsolved. I then discuss a strategy available to impermissivists, according to which rationality bears a quite strong connection to truth. I argue that this second strategy is successful.
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APA
Horowitz, S. (2019). The Truth Problem for Permissivism. The Journal of Philosophy, 116(5), 237-262. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2019116516
Vancouver
Horowitz S. The Truth Problem for Permissivism. The Journal of Philosophy. 2019;116(5):237-262. doi:10.5840/jphil2019116516
BibTeX
@article{Horowitz2019,
author = {Horowitz, Sophie},
title = {The Truth Problem for Permissivism},
journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2019},
volume = {116},
number = {5},
pages = {237--262},
doi = {10.5840/jphil2019116516}
}
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