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Votes, Tickets, and Cabinets: Weighted Executive Sortition as a Constraint on Pivotal-Party Bargaining

Robert Rosenberg

Journal of Sortition · 2026

DOI: 10.53765/3050-0672.3.1.005 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Sortition, 2026. Verfasst von Robert Rosenberg.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Parliamentary democracy normally uses electoral strength twice: first to allocate legislative representation and then, through coalition bargaining, as a resource in allocating executive office. Near a majority threshold, a small party may become pivotal and obtain executive value that depends on strategic location rather than electoral size. This article proposes weighted executive sortition (WES) as a partial reform of the second conversion while leaving the elected legislature intact. Parties first negotiate a governing programme, establish a confidence-capable governing set, and select a prime minister under ordinary constitutional rules. Only then are non-primeministerial portfolios assigned by auditable weighted draws from pre-registered qualified nominee pools, with party weights derived from their seats in the governing set. WES therefore does not eliminate pivotal-party bargaining: the premiership, policy, participation, and confidence remain political. Its narrower claim is that covered ministerial portfolios need not also function as deterministic coalition currency. The design specifies ticket depletion, portfolio tiers, vacancy and anti-transfer rules, and a confidence sequence intended to prevent the portfolio lottery itself from becoming an object of strategic veto. Three effects are defended: expected portfolio allocation remains tied to electoral strength; pivotality has less independent power to guarantee specified covered offices; and individual covered ministries become less negotiable as coalition consideration.Israel’s 2021 election provides a worked illustration. The Bennett-Lapid government is not treated as illegitimate or as a causal test—it makes both the motivation for WES and its boundary unusually visible, because the premiership itself remains outside the baseline draw. The article concludes by treating payoff displacement, constitutional cost, and formation failure as empirical tests rather than assumed benefits.

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APA

Rosenberg, R. (2026). Votes, Tickets, and Cabinets: Weighted Executive Sortition as a Constraint on Pivotal-Party Bargaining. Journal of Sortition. https://doi.org/10.53765/3050-0672.3.1.005

Vancouver

Rosenberg R. Votes, Tickets, and Cabinets: Weighted Executive Sortition as a Constraint on Pivotal-Party Bargaining. Journal of Sortition. 2026. doi:10.53765/3050-0672.3.1.005

BibTeX
@article{Rosenberg2026,
  author = {Rosenberg, Robert},
  title = {Votes, Tickets, and Cabinets: Weighted Executive Sortition as a Constraint on Pivotal-Party Bargaining},
  journal = {Journal of Sortition},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.53765/3050-0672.3.1.005}
}
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