Third-party indignation as acting on behalf of another
The Philosophical Quarterly · 02.12.2025
DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqaf099 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Philosophical Quarterly, online erschienen am 02.12.2025. Verfasst von Jonas Vandieken. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 43 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: DFG.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
On a relational understanding of morality, the entire set of our interpersonal moral obligations is best understood as a set of directed obligations. According to this view, A owes it to B to do X, because B has a valid claim against A that A do X. The challenge for the relational understanding of morality is to explain how it can also be the business of a third-party C to hold A accountable. Morality, after all, is generally everyone’s business. To answer this challenge, I develop a relational account of third-party indignation, according to which C is best understood as acting on behalf of B when holding A accountable as an instance of normative support for B. It is a distinct advantage of the view that it can explain aspects of the moral phenomenology which non-relational accounts cannot explain, in particular the undertheorized phenomenon of third-party wrongings.
Förderung
- DFG
Zitieren
APA
Vandieken, J. (2025). Third-party indignation as acting on behalf of another. The Philosophical Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaf099
Vancouver
Vandieken J. Third-party indignation as acting on behalf of another. The Philosophical Quarterly. 2025. doi:10.1093/pq/pqaf099
BibTeX
@article{Vandieken2025,
author = {Vandieken, Jonas},
title = {Third-party indignation as acting on behalf of another},
journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
year = {2025},
doi = {10.1093/pq/pqaf099}
}
EUVIMED