At a glance
Journal article in Philosophy of Education, 2001. Written by Natasha Levinson.
Abstract (original language)
In Iris Young’s staging of an imaginary dialogue between an activist and a deliberative democrat, we are presented with two familiar figures from the self-help section of our local bookstores: the woman “who loves too much” and the man who rejects her. The two characters share a commitment to social justice, but they understand this commitment quite differently. As a result, they have different understandings of what it means to be a good citizen in “actually existing democracy, with all its existing conflict, disagreement, economic, social, and political inequality.” The deliberative democrat regards reasoned argument in settings that are inclusive and representative as the key to developing just and fair social policies. The activist contends that all of this is little more than a form of political window dressing designed to deflect the ways in which structural inequalities in our society constrain both the process and the substance of deliberation. The deliberative democrat counters that it is possible to structure the process of deliberation in ways that minimize the effects of social inequalities on the capacities of individuals to participate as equals in deliberative contexts. The activist is even more troubled by this attempt to minimize the very phenomenon that he contends ought be made more rather than less visible.
Cite
APA
Levinson, N. (2001). Deliberative Democracy and Justice. Philosophy of Education. https://doi.org/10.47925/2001.056
Vancouver
Levinson N. Deliberative Democracy and Justice. Philosophy of Education. 2001. doi:10.47925/2001.056
BibTeX
@article{Levinson2001,
author = {Levinson, Natasha},
title = {Deliberative Democracy and Justice},
journal = {Philosophy of Education},
year = {2001},
doi = {10.47925/2001.056}
}
EUVIMED