Realism about What? Unobservable Entities and the Metaphysics of Modality
Filosofia Unisinos · 2016
DOI: 10.4013/10780 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Filosofia Unisinos, 2016. Written by Bruno Borge.
Abstract (original language)
Most philosophers who advocate Scientific Realism (SR) endorse also Modal Realism (MR), i.e., assume commitments with objective modality. However, the precise relationship between these positions has been scarcely explored. In this paper I argue that there is an indirect implication from SR to MR. Although the basic thesis of SR does not imply MR, both the main argument for SR and the best realist theory of reference do imply modal commitments.
Cite
APA
Borge, B. (2016). Realism about What? Unobservable Entities and the Metaphysics of Modality. Filosofia Unisinos. https://doi.org/10.4013/10780
Vancouver
Borge B. Realism about What? Unobservable Entities and the Metaphysics of Modality. Filosofia Unisinos. 2016. doi:10.4013/10780
BibTeX
@article{Borge2016,
author = {Borge, Bruno},
title = {Realism about What? Unobservable Entities and the Metaphysics of Modality},
journal = {Filosofia Unisinos},
year = {2016},
doi = {10.4013/10780}
}
EUVIMED