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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Revus, 2026. Verfasst von Kaarlo Tuori. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 12 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-SA 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In my reply to my commentators, I first distinguish legal positivism from legal realism and situate the legal positivism of Kelsen and Hart within the context of modern state law, rejecting positivism’s universalising pretensions. I accept theoretical positivism’s thesis of the non-reducibility of legal normativity to social facticity. However, I refute both Kelsen’s and Hart’s depiction of legal normativity and emphasise the indispensable role in law of the legal culture underpinning surface-level normativity. I also agree with the bare-bones version of positivism’s social thesis but criticise Kelsenian and Hartian positivism for not conceptualising law’s social dimension and for not examining the socio-legal practices where legal normativity is produced, reproduced, and realised. I reject positivism’s separation thesis and way of discussing the relationship between law and morals as a conceptual issue. I point to the claim of non-justness raised by legal speech acts and general legal-cultural principles as tokens of modern law’s connectedness to morals. I renounce the descriptive thesis of methodological positivism by invoking the legal scholar’s position as a participant in law and pointing to their contribution to the ongoing legal discourse on the law’s contents. Finally, I discuss the fecundity of the phenomenological approach for discussing the foundations of legal normativity as well as socio-legal practices.
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APA
Tuori, K. (2026). Beyond legal positivism. Revus, 59. https://doi.org/10.4000/173lf
Vancouver
Tuori K. Beyond legal positivism. Revus. 2026;59. doi:10.4000/173lf
BibTeX
@article{Tuori2026,
author = {Tuori, Kaarlo},
title = {Beyond legal positivism},
journal = {Revus},
year = {2026},
volume = {59},
doi = {10.4000/173lf}
}
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