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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Revus, 2026. Verfasst von Paolo Comanducci. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 10 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-SA 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper critically examines Kaarlo Tuori’s account of legal positivism, highlighting its strengths and theoretical ambiguities. After summarizing the four core theses of positivism—normativity, the social thesis, the separation between law and morality, and the descriptive thesis—I show how Tuori revises these theses in his concept of “critical legal positivism”. This approach overcomes the limitations of Kelsen’s and Hart’s theories by emphasizing the multilayered nature of law and the central role of socio-legal practices and legal culture. Specifically, Tuori criticizes traditional positivism for its inability to adequately explain legal normativity and its connection to the perceived legitimacy of law among citizens. While acknowledging the originality and relevance of Tuori’s framework, the paper raises several objections, specifically, questioning the ambiguity of the normativity thesis, the underestimation of conflict within legal and social practices, and the unclear treatment of the relationship between law and morality. Furthermore, the paper defends the importance of methodological positivism and the distinction between descriptive and evaluative analysis. I ultimately conclude that Tuori’s theory does not constitute a genuine “third way” between positivism and natural law theory, but rather a revised version of legal positivism adapted to contemporary legal developments.
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APA
Comanducci, P. (2026). Which legal positivism?. Revus, 59. https://doi.org/10.4000/16xo4
Vancouver
Comanducci P. Which legal positivism?. Revus. 2026;59. doi:10.4000/16xo4
BibTeX
@article{Comanducci2026,
author = {Comanducci, Paolo},
title = {Which legal positivism?},
journal = {Revus},
year = {2026},
volume = {59},
doi = {10.4000/16xo4}
}
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