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Open access · CC BY-NC 4.0

Efficient investment, search, and sorting in matching markets

Alp Atakan, Michael Richter, Matan Tsur

Theoretical Economics · 2026 · 21 (3) · 810-848

DOI: 10.3982/te6786 ↗

At a glance

Journal article in Theoretical Economics, 2026. Written by Alp Atakan and 2 co-authors. 35 references. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY-NC 4.0). Funded by: Leverhulme Trust, Austrian Science Fund.

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Abstract (original language)

We study markets where heterogeneous agents first make investment decisions and then engage in a costly search to form productive matches. The trading process is a random search and bargaining with explicit search costs. Despite potential hold‐up and matching problems, we prove that the constrained efficient allocation is an equilibrium: the agents' private incentives to invest and to accept/reject potential partners as they search are perfectly aligned with the social benefit. Furthermore, we establish a new sorting result for two‐sided markets, equilibrium existence, and conditions for uniqueness.

Funding

  • Leverhulme Trust
  • Austrian Science Fund

Cite

APA

Atakan, A., Richter, M., & Tsur, M. (2026). Efficient investment, search, and sorting in matching markets. Theoretical Economics, 21(3), 810-848. https://doi.org/10.3982/te6786

Vancouver

Atakan A, Richter M, Tsur M. Efficient investment, search, and sorting in matching markets. Theoretical Economics. 2026;21(3):810-848. doi:10.3982/te6786

BibTeX
@article{Atakan2026,
  author = {Atakan, Alp and Richter, Michael and Tsur, Matan},
  title = {Efficient investment, search, and sorting in matching markets},
  journal = {Theoretical Economics},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {21},
  number = {3},
  pages = {810--848},
  doi = {10.3982/te6786}
}
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