Semistability in roommate problems
Theoretical Economics · 2026 · 21 (4) · 1096-1125
DOI: 10.3982/te6562 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theoretical Economics, 2026. Verfasst von P. Jean-Jacques Herings und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 34 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0). Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Exploratory Research for Advanced Technology.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study the roommate problem allowing for preferences with indifferences and agents remaining single. A stable outcome need not exist. We introduce semi‐stability, a novel notion that guarantees existence and restores stability through minimal policy or group interventions. We build an equilibrium foundation for semistability by showing its equivalence to a newly proposed choice‐based equilibrium concept. We show that undominated semistable outcomes are Pareto optimal and under strict preferences, every semistable outcome is Pareto optimal. Nevertheless, standard structural properties, such as the rural hospital theorem and the lattice properties, fail for semistable outcomes. We also discuss possible applications.
Förderung
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
- Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
- Exploratory Research for Advanced Technology
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APA
Herings, P. J., & Zhou, Y. (2026). Semistability in roommate problems. Theoretical Economics, 21(4), 1096-1125. https://doi.org/10.3982/te6562
Vancouver
Herings PJ, Zhou Y. Semistability in roommate problems. Theoretical Economics. 2026;21(4):1096-1125. doi:10.3982/te6562
BibTeX
@article{Herings2026,
author = {Herings, P. Jean-Jacques and Zhou, Yu},
title = {Semistability in roommate problems},
journal = {Theoretical Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {21},
number = {4},
pages = {1096--1125},
doi = {10.3982/te6562}
}
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