Commitment Problems in Alliance Formation
American Journal of Political Science · 2023-10 · 67 (4) · 1012-1025
DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12693 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Journal of Political Science, online erschienen am 31.01.2022. Verfasst von Brett V. Benson und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 24-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 58 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
If military alliances cause significant shifts in the distribution of power, why does anticipation of their formation or expansion provoke hostility from adversaries in some cases and not others? We develop a theory to explain this variation, advancing three arguments about the connection between alliances, commitment problems and war. First, we show that prospective allies can avoid provoking a common enemy by offering concessions to offset losses from an anticipated power shift from an alliance. Second, limits to an alliance's power or implementation speed may make such bargains possible. Allies manipulate these factors to set the terms of cooperation to avoid provoking a shared enemy. Finally, when such bargains are not possible, incentives for preventive war exist but the outbreak of such wars may be avoided. Although preventive war cannot be ruled out altogether, the conditions that make it most attractive also make it unlikely to be carried out.
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APA
Benson, B. V., & Smith, B. C. (2023). Commitment Problems in Alliance Formation. American Journal of Political Science, 67(4), 1012-1025. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12693
Vancouver
Benson BV, Smith BC. Commitment Problems in Alliance Formation. American Journal of Political Science. 2023;67(4):1012-1025. doi:10.1111/ajps.12693
BibTeX
@article{Benson2023,
author = {Benson, Brett V. and Smith, Bradley C.},
title = {Commitment Problems in Alliance Formation},
journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
year = {2023},
volume = {67},
number = {4},
pages = {1012--1025},
doi = {10.1111/ajps.12693}
}
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