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Contract terms monotonicity in matching markets

Cyril Rouault

Theoretical Economics · 2026 · 21 (4) · 1258-1293

DOI: 10.3982/te6473 ↗

At a glance

Journal article in Theoretical Economics, 2026. Written by Cyril Rouault. 36 references. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY-NC 4.0).

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Abstract (original language)

We study doctor–hospital matching markets with contracts, in which hospitals can offer a range of contract terms to doctors. We show that introducing new terms can reduce doctors' welfare, whereas withdrawing terms may generate a Pareto improvement. We establish the preference domains under which welfare is preserved and show that only agent‐lexicographic preferences for all agents ensure that no doctor is worse off when additional terms are introduced. Since this condition is rarely satisfied in practice, our results imply that most real‐world markets are vulnerable to welfare losses when the set of contract terms expands.

Cite

APA

Rouault, C. (2026). Contract terms monotonicity in matching markets. Theoretical Economics, 21(4), 1258-1293. https://doi.org/10.3982/te6473

Vancouver

Rouault C. Contract terms monotonicity in matching markets. Theoretical Economics. 2026;21(4):1258-1293. doi:10.3982/te6473

BibTeX
@article{Rouault2026,
  author = {Rouault, Cyril},
  title = {Contract terms monotonicity in matching markets},
  journal = {Theoretical Economics},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {21},
  number = {4},
  pages = {1258--1293},
  doi = {10.3982/te6473}
}
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