Lemonade from lemons: Information design and adverse selection
Theoretical Economics · 2026 · 21 (1) · 281-324
DOI: 10.3982/te6451 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theoretical Economics, 2026. Verfasst von Navin Kartik und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 8-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 42 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
A seller posts a price for a single object. The seller's and buyer's values may be interdependent. We characterize the set of payoff vectors across all information structures. Simple feasibility and individual‐rationality constraints identify the payoff set. The buyer can obtain the entire surplus; often, noninformational mechanisms cannot enlarge the payoff set. We also study payoffs when the buyer is more informed than the seller, and when the buyer is fully informed. All three payoff sets coincide (only) in notable special cases—in particular, when there is complete breakdown in a “lemons market” with an uninformed seller and fully informed buyer.
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APA
Kartik, N., & Zhong, W. (2026). Lemonade from lemons: Information design and adverse selection. Theoretical Economics, 21(1), 281-324. https://doi.org/10.3982/te6451
Vancouver
Kartik N, Zhong W. Lemonade from lemons: Information design and adverse selection. Theoretical Economics. 2026;21(1):281-324. doi:10.3982/te6451
BibTeX
@article{Kartik2026,
author = {Kartik, Navin and Zhong, Weijie},
title = {Lemonade from lemons: Information design and adverse selection},
journal = {Theoretical Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {21},
number = {1},
pages = {281--324},
doi = {10.3982/te6451}
}
EUVIMED